Predestination
[March 1997]
By James Ayers
It is ironic that the father of Presbyterianism, John Calvin (1509-1564),
is most famous for his doctrine of predestination, because it is
only one detail of his thinking. The discussion of the topic takes
place two-thirds of the way through the final edition of Calvin's
Institutes of the Christian Religion, following a chapter on Christian
liberty of conscience and another on prayer.
Still, all Christian thinkers must deal, sooner or later, with
the relationship between God's call and human response. Calvin's
conviction that God is in charge of all events led him to the doctrine
that if some people are saved while others are damned, this must
be because God chose them for these fates. Having come to that conclusion,
Calvin was not shy in stating his view:
"By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which
he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard
to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained
to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly,
as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say
that he has been predestined to life or to death.
"We say, then, that Scripture clearly proves this much, that
God by his eternal and immutable counsel determined once for all
those whom it was his pleasure one day to admit to salvation, and
those whom, on the other hand, it was his pleasure to doom to destruction.
We maintain that this counsel, as regards the elect, is founded
on his free mercy, without any respect to human worth, while those
whom he dooms to destruction are excluded from access to life by
a just and blameless, but at the same time incomprehensible judgment"
(Institutes, III.21.5,7, Beveridge translation).
This is not mere fatalism, the belief that every human action has
been irrevocably predetermined. Still, if a person's eternal destiny
is sealed, is it all that comforting to suppose everyday choices
remain free?
The starkness of affirming that God has preselected some for heaven
and others for hell has moved people to try to put the puzzle together
in several ways. Over the centuries many long theological essays
have been written, presenting different efforts to make it all fit
together smoothly, and criticizing the failures of other attempts.
The particulars of those arguments will not be presented here. Instead,
what follows might be considered a rough sketch map suitable perhaps
for the day tourist, lacking the detail a specialist might want
but sufficient to get a feel for the theological territory.
The four statements below are all things that a Christian might
intuitively want to say, but it becomes difficult to say all of
them:
A. God's sovereign decision to save is sufficient; all those
whom God wills to save are saved.
B. God loves all the world, and wills to save all the world.
C. Some people are damned.
D. Those who are saved must respond in faith.
People can decide they know the truth or falseness of any three
of these statements; but at that point the fourth becomes problematic.
For true Calvinists, it becomes difficult to say God loves the
world, because God gives many the inescapable destiny of eternal
punishment. Calvin calls this God's "just and blameless . .
. incomprehensible judgment." But how can creating people with
the intention of damning them be the mark of a loving God?
Reaction to this problem led to the rise of Arminianism, named
after the Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609). Arminianism
proposes that God knows from eternity whether people will have faith
or not, and it is on the basis of this foreknowledge that God predestines
them to salvation or perdition. Yet Arminianism's effort to combine
divine election with divine love had its own cost--it made human
faith the decisive factor in salvation. How can we speak of the
sovereignty of God if God is unable to save all whom God desires
to save?
The Universalist movement, founded in America by John Murray (1741-1815),
argues that because God loves and wills to save all the world, all
the world is in fact saved. This seems like an appealing doctrine--but
what are we then to make of all of the Bible's calls to faith, obedience
and discipleship? Are such things optional? Or is faithful response
necessary?
The Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth (1886-1968) proposed that
each of these three viewpoints is mistaken, both in failing to deal
adequately with the overall sweep of what Scripture teaches and
in pretending to know whether or not all are saved.
Barth pointed out that the texts that speak of predestination speak
simply of predestination to life. "Those whom [God] foreknew
he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son"
(Romans 8:29). God "chose us in Christ before the foundation
of the world to be holy and blameless before him in love. He destined
us for adoption as his children through Jesus Christ, according
to the good pleasure of his will" (Ephesians 1:4-5).
Barth's response to Calvinism would be that we cannot claim to
know just how inclusive the "us" will turn out to be,
and to point out that the texts do not say there are others whom
God predestined to damnation. To Arminianism Barth would insist
that the text clearly emphasizes the eternal decision of God, not
the foreseen human response. Yet Barth could point out to Universalism
that there is no indication that a holy and blameless life before
God is merely optional.
Still, such an analysis leaves us not knowing just how universal
God's salvation will prove to be. In the end, will the purpose of
God to save all the world be fulfilled? Or will it be frustrated
by human rebelliousness? Can we be satisfied if we do not yet have
the final answer to that question?
When the Blue Fairy begins her work with Pinocchio, she creates
for him a world of possibilities that he could never have known
as a marionette hanging against the back wall of Gepetto's workshop.
Prior to any possible decision on his part, she chooses for him
a destiny: to become a real boy.
But in spite of this predestination, as the story progresses it
is not at all obvious that Pinocchio will arrive at this goal. There
are moments when it appears the Blue Fairy should simply admit that
the experiment is a failure, Pinocchio will never get it right,
and she should just turn him back into a puppet and hang him back
in the closet.
If the Fairy does this, Pinocchio will not have any more failures.
He will not lose any more friends. He will not make any more mistakes.
And he will never become a real boy. But it is his destiny to become
a real boy. And until we arrive at the end of the story, we do not
know whether Pinocchio's destiny will be fulfilled or not.
It certainly seems that way for people in the Bible. There are
no texts that indicate that God has chosen a given individual for
eternal damnation, but there are many passages that indicate God
has chosen someone for a prominent purpose in this earthly life.
For example, God chooses Jacob over Esau (Genesis 25:23), but even
though Rebekah knows about God's choice she is quite uncertain that
Jacob will live long enough for it to come true (27:41-45). Twenty
years later Jacob finds himself in great fear for his life at his
brother's hands (32:3-7). We might wish to think that if God has
chosen Jacob for a destiny, nothing could go wrong with the fulfillment
of that destiny. But to the people involved in the story it certainly
seemed possible that Jacob could be killed and his destiny unfulfilled.
The story of Jeremiah is similar. God chooses him to be a prophet
before he is born (Jeremiah 1:5), and yet Jeremiah is quite aware
that his life can be ended before he finishes his prophesying (38:1-15).
Jeremiah is the one who tells us we are all like a clay pot in the
hand of God (18:1-6)--a strong image that what God intends will
surely come to pass. But he immediately follows that with a two-part
warning: against presuming that if God has promised good, God has
to do it no matter how much we rebel; and against despair when God
has declared judgment, for repentance and forgiveness remain possible
(18:7-10).
What, then, should the doctrine of predestination mean for people
today? First, we should be confident that God gives to all of us
the destiny of being transformed into the children of God. If God
has chosen such a destiny for us before we could choose for ourselves,
then we are predestined: predestined by God for good.
Second, we should not be presumptuous, as though we could disdain
others because we suppose God loves us more than them. Or as though
we could presume that because God has destined us for good, we can
gleefully rebel against God's purpose with no risk. Or as though
even the most wicked is beyond the possibility of grace and forgiveness.
Third, we should be humble, accepting that there are things we
do not know. In particular, while we are in the midst of the story,
we are not yet in a position to know the end of the story.
And fourth, we should be hopeful, with prayerful confidence that
in the end God's purpose will indeed be fulfilled, in our own lives,
and in the life of all the world. And why not? Why should we not
trust and pray for God's will to be done, on earth as it is in heaven?
And why not also live on that basis--living lives of hope and faith
and joy, as those whose destiny is to be the children of God?
James Ayers is pastor of South Frankfort Presbyterian
Church in Frankfort, Ky., and "Q & A" columnist for
Presbyterians Today.
A
"Rough Sketch Map"
of Four Perspectives:
Calvinism:
A. God's sovereign decision to save is sufficient; all those
whom God wills to save are saved.
B. Some are damned (because God chose them to be damned).
C. Those who are saved must respond in faith (because God's grace
creates this faith in them).
Problem:
We are unable to say what it means that God loves the world,
because God has created most of the people of the world with the
intention of condemning them to hell.
Arminianism:
A. God loves all the world, and wills to save all the world.
B. Those who are saved must respond in faith.
C. Some are damned (because they do not respond in faith).
Problem:
We are unable to say that God's sovereign will to save is sufficient;
some of the people God wills to save nevertheless are not saved.
Universalism:
A. God's sovereign decision to save is sufficient; all those
whom God wills to save are saved.
B. God loves all the world, and wills to save all the world.
C. No one is damned; everyone is saved.
Problem:
We are unable to say why people must respond in faith; they are
saved whether they believe or not.
Karl Barth:
A. God's sovereign decision to save is sufficient; all those
whom God wills to save are saved.
B. God loves all the world, and wills to save all the world.
C. Those who are saved must respond in faith.
Problem:
We are unable to say whether anyone is damned.
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